




**United States Department of
Health & Human Services
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)**



The Pandemic Influenza Countermeasures Portfolio

Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA)

**Michael Perdue, Ph.D.
Director, Influenza Division
HHS/ASPR/BARDA**




Today:



- **Influenza: Virus(es) and disease(s)**
- **Consequences of Pandemic Influenza**
- **US response(s) and evolution of the Pandemic Influenza Portfolio**
- **BARDA's Influenza Division**



Influenza



Virus(es)

Hemagglutinin

Neuraminidase

Subtypes

H5N1

H1N1

Antigenic "shift"

Antigenic "drift"

Sero-conversion

Zoonoses

Transmission

Re-assortants

Mild URT infections

Severe URT infections

Viral pneumonia

Bacterial pneumonia

Severe Acute Respiratory disease.


Systemic infections

**Epidemics, pandemics,
sporadic infections**

High risk groups



Disease(s)




1918-19 Influenza



Measures of Disease Burden

Estimates of morbidity and mortality 2009 pH1N1 Influenza

April 2009 - April 2010




Slide courtesy of Lyn Finelli- CDC



H1N1 hospitalization rates




EIP* Laboratory-Confirmed Cumulative Hospitalization Rates (per 100,000), 2009-10 Season




*EIP results represent surveillance in the 10 EIP states (CA, CO, CT, GA, MD, MN, NM, NY, OR, TN)

EIP* Laboratory-Confirmed Cumulative Hospitalization Rates (per 100,000), 2010-11 Season



*EIP results represent surveillance in the 10 EIP states (CA, CO, CT, GA, MD, MN, NM, NY, OR, TN)



OUR MISSION: Using the influenza virus against itself



Advancing science and technology into countermeasures





Illustration: Chris Rickel/Science. Reprinted with permission from Science Vol. 312, page 380 (21 April 2006) © 2006 by AAAS

Estimated Timeline of H1N1pdm Vaccine Development and Delivery in the U.S.



Slide courtesy of Dr. N. Cox CDC

(*) Manufacturers were transiently limited in their ability to develop seed viruses due to lack of facilities to grow virus in large volume at the required BSL3 biocontainment
 (\$) Production of monovalent inactivated vaccine is a continuous process
www.cdc.gov/H1N1flu





FLUVIEW

A Weekly Influenza Surveillance Report Prepared by the Influenza Division



Percentage of Visits for Influenza-like Illness (ILI) Reported by the U.S. Outpatient Influenza-like Illness Surveillance Network (ILINet), Weekly National Summary, October 1, 2006 – January 2, 2010





HHS Responses to Influenza Pandemics




Effective Vaccines and Programs-More, Better, Faster

Effective Antivirals and Delivery- Avoiding resistance

Sensitive, Specific Diagnostics- Usage and interpretation

Mitigation of Severe Respiratory Impact- Stockpiles, surge, simplicity



Infrastructure Development-cell based production




Global pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccine production capacity: June 2009 estimate

Assumptions / Methodology


- Survey sent to 36 potential influenza vaccine manufacturers
 - 100% response rate
 - All 21 current influenza vaccine producers responded
 - 26 manufacturers that intend to produce pandemic vaccines
 - Includes LAIV and one recombinant vaccine capacity
- Survey assumes
 - 1:1 H1N1 to seasonal yields
 - Most dose sparing formulation for each manufacturer
 - Use of full production capacity

Estimated H1N1 Vaccine Capacity

At 1:1 yields, most dose-sparing formulation, full capacity




Source: WHO survey (Collin N. et al, Vaccine 2009. 27(38):5194-6)



ID International Program Objectives




- 1. Protect America by reducing risks of influenza epidemics outside our borders-one world one health.**
- 2. Help to develop and sustain influenza vaccine manufacturing capabilities and capacity and pandemic readiness: promote investment; establish partnerships**
- 3. Help achieve sustainable influenza vaccine production capacity worldwide by leveraging BARDA's unique resources.**



International Capacity Building Total Financial Commitment through 2009: \$52 million



- **FY 2005** \$1 million ASPR funding to Vabiotech-Vietnam
- **FY 2006** \$10 million of emergency supplemental funding to WHO; granted to India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Mexico & Brazil
- **FY 2007** Funding requested in annual budget; not appropriated
- **FY 2008** \$14.4 million of annual funding to WHO; granted to six original grantees plus Egypt, Serbia and Romania.
- **FY 2009** \$3.6 million to WHO; granted to Russia's Institute for Experimental Medicine; plus \$7.9 million to PATH; and \$3.5 for rapid diagnostics to support clinical trials
- **FY 2010** \$11M to WHO, Universities: Lausanne, NC State, Utah State. Non-profit: IDRI (Seattle)
- **FY 2011** \$11: WHO, adjuvants, training, multiproduct manufacturing feasibility



Serum Institute of India, Pune





BARDA Influenza Division (Transitional)



**Director: Michael Perdue (until July 19)
Deputy Director: Robert Huebner**

Current Staff: 32 (27 FTE, 5 Contractors)

**5 Divisional Teams: Antivirals; Vaccines-advanced development;
Vaccines-Stockpiles; Diagnostics/Devices; “International”**

**BARDA Pandemic Influenza Program: > 50 staff including
manufacturing, clinical, regulatory, innovation**



Interfacing with BARDA



- www.phe.gov
 - Program description, information, news, announcements
- www.medicalcountermeasures.gov
 - Portal to BARDA
 - Register, request a meeting
 - Tech Watch
- www.fedbizopps.gov
 - Official announcements and detailed information about all government contract solicitations

